Louisiana Law Review
Volume 45 | Number 2
Developments in the Law, 1983-1984: A Symposium
November 1984

Local Government Law
Kenneth M. Murchison

Repository Citation
Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, 45 La. L. Rev. (1984)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol45/iss2/10

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW
Kenneth M. Murchison *

The October 1983 term of the United States Supreme Court produced
several opinions in areas that are important to local governments. This
year's decisions considered the limitations applicable to a municipality's
attempt to grant preferences to its own residents' as well as the permissibility of local sign regulations. 2 In addition, the Court granted
certiorariin an antitrust case against a local government3 and requested

briefs on whether the Tenth Amendment limitation established in National League of Cities v. Usery/ should be reconsidered.' The discussion

below briefly evaluates the decisions from the present term, while the
certiorariand reargument actions should set the agenda for next year's
symposium article.

On the state level, lawsuits involving local governments continued
to make up a significant portion of Louisiana's appellate caseload.
As in the past, the decisions covered all phases of local government

law including the relations of local governments to the state, 6 election

Copyright 1985, by
*
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Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State Uni-

versity.
1. South-Central Timber Dev. Corp. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984); United
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984).
2. City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
3. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984). For a brief
description of the Hallie decision at the circuit level, see Murchison, Developments in the
Law, 1982-1983-Local Government Law, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 381 (1983).
4. 426 U.S. 833, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976).
5. Donovan v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 104 S. Ct. 3582 (1984); Garcia
v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., l4 S. Ct. 3582 (1984).
6. City of New Orleans v. State, 443 So. 2d 562 (La. 1983); Spillman v. City of
Baton Rouge, 441 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1213
(La. 1984). See infra notes 107-40 and accompanying text. See also City of Port Allen
v. Louisiana Mun. Risk Mgt. Agency, 439 So. 2d 399 (La. 1983) (The imposition of
solidary liability for claims not paid by Risk Management Agency on all local governments
who join the agency violates state constitutional provision prohibiting local governments
from loaning, pledging, or donating their assets to any other person.); State v. Stirgus,
437 So. 2d 249 (La. 1983) (The question of whether notice of intent to introduce a local
law was published at least 30 days prior to the introduction of the bill is subject to
judicial review.); McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury, 440 So. 2d 1369 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1983) (stating that district court can obtain writ of mandamus compelling police jury
to budget funds necessary for the effective and efficient operation of the court).
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7. E.g., Foley v. Dowling, 445 So. 2d 785 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (A resident of
an area that would be annexed into city upon adoption of pending annexation ordinance
can qualify as a candidate for alderman.); Wellborn v. Jones, 445 So. 2d 787 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1984) (A candidate's temporary absence from city to serve a one-year term as
president of a national service organization did not affect his status as a resident of the
city.); Johnston v. Morehouse Parish Police Jury, 445 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 So. 2d 1344 (La. 1984) (La. R.S. 26:582 provides local governments
authority, pursuant to a local option election, to ban 3.2% beer as well as other alcoholic
beverages.); Ingram v. Seal, 445 So. 2d 3 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (Where the number
of qualified voters prohibited from voting would have changed the order of second and
third place finishers in the first primary, proper remedy was a restricted election between
those two candidates to determine who would be the general election opponent of the
candidate who received the most votes in the original primary.); Scoggins v. Jones, 442
So. 2d 1203 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (Proof that the number of illegal votes cast exceeded
winner's margin of victory was insufficient to invalidate the election in the absence of
proof that the illegal votes were cast for the victorious candidate.); Kroger Co. v. City
of Baker, 434 So. 2d 586 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (Alcoholic beverages cannot be sold
in an area that has been annexed by "dry" municipality.).
8. E.g., City of Alexandria v. Lanier, 446 So. 2d 547 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1984)
(stating that mayor lacks procedural capacity to prosecute lawsuits following passage of
city council resolution mandating dismissal of all suits brought without its approval); Roy
v. Humphries, 445 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 447 So. 2d 1069 (La.
1984) (declaring that city council's desire to force mayor to comply with contract between
the city and power authority constituted "extreme necessity" authorizing the city council
to retain special counsel); McElveen v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, 443 So. 2d 666 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 So. 2d 1222 (La. 1984) (stating that a parish has
authority to designate parish treasurer rather than sheriff as the tax collector for parish's
occupational license taxes); Anzelmo v. Commission on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 435
So. 2d 1082 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 1220 (La. 1983) (allowing
Commission on Ethics for Public Employees to exercise jurisdiction over city attorney's
sons who are employed by a law firm that performs work for the city as an independent
contractor); Becnel v. St. John the Baptist Parish Police Jury, 434 So. 2d 83 (La. App.
5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 435 So. 2d 442 (La. 1983) (declaring that police jury administrator's service as secretary to the board of directors of a bank constituted a breach
of employment contract that obligated him to "devote his entire time and energy to the
furtherance of the business of the . . . Police Jury").
9. E.g., City of Shreveport v. Stanley, 446 So. 2d 839 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 So. 2d 956 (La. 1984) (An appointing authority has a "reasonable time" in
which to decide whether to appoint an employee to the single position in a civil service
classification or to recommend that the civil service board abolish the classification.);
Pizzitolo v. Kenner Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 445 So. 2d 1306 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 So. 2d 1357 (La. 1984) (The "working test" period provided for
new employees applies to former employee who is rehired.); City of Bossier v. Lee, 445
So. 2d 92 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1984) (When an employee who is serving a "working test"
in a new position submits a resignation effective before the expiration of the test period,
the appointing authority may demote the employee to his prior position.); Tate v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 444 So. 2d 219 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d
314 (La. 1984) (Tenure Act does not apply to refusal to renew a teacher's contract to
coach basketball and baseball in addition to his duties as a classroom teacher.); Griffin
v. City of Baton Rouge, 444 So. 2d 186 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (The right to judicial
review of dismissal by local government is a constitutional right that exists even in the
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absence of specific statutory authority.); Myers v. Department of Fin., 437 So. 2d 978
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (The civil service commission's determination that dismissal
should be reduced to suspension will be sustained unless shown to be arbitrary or capricious.); Cittadino v. Department of Police, 434 So. 2d 164 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
(Neither police officer's working as a security guard during a period when he was on
sick leave from police department nor his failure to discover a knife during a search of
a prisoner was sufficient to justify his dismissal.).
10. E.g., Pickering v. City of Baton Rouge, 442 So. 2d 522 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983)
(A city ordinance prohibiting permits to move buildings "not up to city parish standard"
into the city requires only that building meet building code and other standards within
six months of application for permit, not that it satisfy building code before being moved
into the city.); Tatum v. Village of Converse, 440 So. 2d 1354 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 444 So. 2d 121 (La. 1984) (A municipality must prove that building's condition
was dilapidated and dangerous at time condemnation was ordered; therefore, proof about
its condition at an earlier time is insufficient.); Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury,
436 So. 2d 515 (La. 1983) (An ordinance precluding use of a facility for raffles, bingo,
or keno games more than two nights a month is a reasonable exercise of the police
power.). Cf. McDaniel v. Town of Krotz Springs, 448 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984) (holding that failure of town to require written application from present applicant
or from prior applicants constituted a waiver of ordinance provision providing for written
applications for permits).
11. E.g., Bunch v. Town of St. Francisville, 446 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1984) (The term "dwellings" in portion of zoning ordinance describing permitted uses in
residential districts included two family dwellings as well as single family dwellings.); Cross
v. City of New Orleans, 446 So. 2d 1253 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 So. 2d
1360 (La. 1984) (The city may revoke an erroneously issued building permit even when
property owner, relying on the permit, has expended substantial sums.); Big Train Constr.
Co. v. Parish of St. Tammany, 446 So. 2d 889 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (Because of
the large element of discretion in decisions to grant or to deny building permits, mandamus
is an inappropriate procedure for challenging the parish's decision to deny such a permit.);
City of New Orleans v. Century Mgmt., Inc., 442 So. 2d 831 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983)
(The two-year prescriptive period for abating a zoning violation does not begin to run
until the city has knowledge of the violation.); Pailet v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.
2d 1091 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 757 (La. 1983) (Occupancy of one
of five apartments did not preserve a building in nonconforming use status as a five
family dwelling.).
12. E.g., Brownlee Dev. Corp. v. Taylor, 438 So. 2d 618 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983)
(A parish police jury has no authority to negate or to override local planning commission's
approval of subdivision plat.); Ellis v. Dearing, 435 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 765 (La. 1983) (In the absence of a zoning ordinance permitting
"home occupations" in residential areas, a one-chair beauty shop in owner's home constituted a violation of subdivision restrictions designating all lots as "residential lots.").
Cf. Tucker v. Special Children's Found., Inc., 449 So. 2d 45 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 450 So. 2d 959 (La. 1984) (holding that a state law declaring that community
homes housing six or fewer mentally retarded individuals with no more than two live-in
staff shall be considered single family units was a reasonable exercise of the police power
that applied notwithstanding residential subdivision restrictions).
13. E.g., A.V! Smith Constr. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 450 So. 2d 39 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1984) (holding a school board liable in quantum meruit to a contractor who
repaired fire damage at request of school board's agents); LeBlanc v. City of Plaquemine,
448 So. 2d 699 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (The city's extension of electric service to persons
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liability of local governments, 14 and construction of the Open Meetings
Law 5 and the Public Records Act.' 6 The discussion below analyzes the
decisions explaining the status of local governments vis-a-vis the state

as well as selected cases involving tort liability issues.
residing outside of city created an agreement that endured for a reasonable term, not
one terminable at the will of the customer.); Hebert v. Livingston Parish School Bd.,
438 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (holding that a principal had authority to bind
school board with respect to a contract to provide musical entertainment at a school
dance); North Cent. Utils., Inc. v. Walker Community Water Sys., Inc., 437 So. 2d 922
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1983) (stating that a low bidder on contract subject to public bid law
has a cause of action for damages against a public entity that erroneously awarded the
contract to another bidder).
14. Various cases addressing two issues-identifying the "employer" of persons who
work for certain state officers and determining when local governments are liable for
missing or inoperative traffic signs or signals-are discussed infra notes 142-87 and accompanying text. See also Rodrigue v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1042 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1984) (A statute immunizing owners of land from liability to persons who
use land for recreational purposes applies to protect parish recreational department from
liability for injuries sustained at playground owned by the parish.); Parramore v. City
of New Orleans, 447 So. 2d 86 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984) (Police officer's failure to use
his siren or emergency lights constituted negligence for which the city was responsible.);
Langford v. City of Leesville, 442 So. 2d 1375 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983) (The risk that
arrestee would escape from arresting officers and commit suicide did not fall within scope
of officer's duty to save prisoner from harm in the absence of evidence showing that the
arrestee had suicidal tendencies or a propensity to harm himself.); Smith v. Vernon Parish
School Bd., 442 So. 2d 1319 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 445 So. 2d 451 (La.
1984) (Neither a teacher nor the school board is liable for injuries suffered by a student
in an accident at school in absence of proof that the teacher exercised negligent supervision.); Allison v. City of Baton Rouge, 439 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied,440 So. 2d 728 (La. 1983) (The city-parish is not liable for injuries suffered as a
result of buzzard that had been feeding on a carcass on the road shoulder flying into
the path of motorcyclist.); Acadian Heritage Realty, Inc. v. City of Lafayette, 434 So.
2d 182 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 728 (La. 1983) (City's operation of
landfill constituted a public nuisance rendering city liable for damages of surrounding
landowners.); Kluka v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 433 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1983) (Because high school coach did not act unreasonably in accepting student's challenge
to a wrestling match, school board was not liable for injuries student suffered during the
match.). Cf., Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 446 So. 2d 760 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983),
aff'd, 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985) (stating that the statute limiting liability in medical
malpractice actions to $500,000 applies to action brought against governing board of stateowned hospital and is constitutional).
15. E.g., Delta Dev. Co. v. Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council, 451 So. 2d 134
(La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 So. 2d 172 (La. 1984) (An action of a local
governing body that is voidable because adopted in violation of the Open Meetings Law
can be cured and ratified by a subsequent ratification resolution that is adopted in
compliance with the law.); Hanerjager v. Dixie Elec. Membership Corp., 434 So. 2d 500
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1983) (An electric cooperative corporation is not a "public body" as
that term is defined in the Open Meetings Law.).
16. E.g., Title Research Corp. v. Rausch, 450 So. 2d 933 (La. 1984) (The clerk of
court must make conveyance and mortgage records available for copying by abstract
company.); Angelico v. Lee, 441 So. 2d 355 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983) (Personal identi-
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FEDERAL-LoCAL RELATIONS

Preferences for Local Residents
Local governments have frequently established preferences for their
own residents when distributing various benefits. In addition to residency
requirements for public employment,1 7 local governments have also tried
to channel the benefits of public contracts to their residents. Last year,
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers18 encouraged
the expansion of these preferences by rejecting one constitutional
challenge to a preference scheme. Specifically, White held that the
market-participant exception immunized a municipal requirement that
city residents comprise at least one-half of the work force on construction
projects financed with city funds from a constitutional attack grounded
in the commerce clause.' 9
Decisions in the 1983 term confined White in two important respects.
First, the Court failed to extend the market-participant exception to
allow a state to require that timber purchased from the state be processed
within the state. Second, the Court refused to establish a parallel market-

fication folders of former reserve officers are exempt from requirements of the Public
Records Act because they relate to the internal security of the sheriff's department.).
17. The United States Supreme Court has been very tolerant of residency requirements
for municipal employment. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S.
645, 96 S. Ct. 1154 (1976) (per curiam), the court held that a municipal residency
requirement did not violate a police officer's right to interstate travel, and Detroit Police
Officers Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950, 92 S. Ct. 1173 (1972), dismissed equal
protection and due process claims for want of a substantial federal question.
The status of residency requirements under state law is less clear. The Louisiana
Supreme Court has never addressed the issue, and the decisions of the courts of appeal
are not entirely in harmony. In 1980, the second circuit reversed the dismissal of a
municipal firefighter on the ground that the city had not shown that the nonresident
status impaired the efficient operation of the fire department. White v. City of Winnfield
Fire Dep't, 384 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980). Three years later, the fourth circuit
followed White in reversing the dismissal of a municipal police officer in Daniel v.
Department of Police, 426 So. 2d 282 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), but more recently a
footnote in a case decided on other grounds indicates that some members of the fourth
circuit doubt whether Daniel was correctly decided. Werner v. Department of Police, 435
So. 2d 475, 476 n.1 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983). Finally, in Smiley v. City of Winnfield
Police Dep't, 438 So. 2d 680 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983), the second circuit upheld the
city's residence requirement for police officers on the ground that the city had shown
that it bore "a reasonable and substantial relation to the services offered and expected
by the police department." Id. at 681.
18. 460 U.S. 204, 103 S. Ct. 1042 (1983). For a more detailed analysis of the White
holding and its significance, see Murchison, supra note 3, at 376-80.
19. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have power . . . [t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes."). For a brief description of how the commerce clause restricts state regulatory
power, see Murchison, supra note 3, at 376.
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participant exception for preference schemes challenged on the grounds

that they violated the privileges and immunities clause 0 rather than
commerce clause. Taken together, the two decisions seem to have produced a significant alteration of the constitutional analysis applicable to
preferences granted local residents. On the one hand, they probably
prohibit most of the more extreme preference schemes that could have
been suggested following White, 21 even though they stop short of overruling the earlier decision. On the other hand, they also open the door
for renewed challenges to employment preferences as invalid under the
privileges and immunities clause.
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke22 involved a
challenge to a proposed contract of the state of Alaska requiring that
the timber purchased under the contract be processed within the state
before being exported. 23 The Court reversed a Ninth Circuit holding that
Congress had "implicitly authorized" the Alaska requirement for instate processing,2 4 but failed to produce a majority opinion on the

question of whether Alaska had acted as a market participant in imposing
the in-state processing requirement.
Only four members of the Court joined Justice White's opinion
rejecting Alaska's market-participant argument. 25 In that opinion, Justice

White declared the following limit to the doctrine recognized in White:
20. U. S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. I ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
21. For some suggestions as to ways local governments could use White to grant
preferences, see Murchison, supra note 3 at 380.
22. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984). Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor, dissented.
In his view, "the line of distinction drawn in the plurality opinion between the State as
market participant and the State as market regulator [was] . . . artificial and unconvincing"
because it was supported only by intuition and dogmatic assertion. Id. at 2248. Relying
on White, he would have focused instead on the economic reality of the state requirement,
which he described as "merely paying the buyer of the timber indirectly, by means of a
reduced price, to hire Alaska residents to process the timber." Id. Inasmuch as "existing
precedent" would allow the state to "accomplish that same result" in other ways-by
selling only to companies with Alaska processing plants, by subsidizing the processing
industry within the state, or by processing the logs itself-he regarded it as "unduly
formalistic to conclude that the one path chosen by the State as best suited to promote
its concerns is the path forbidden it by the Commerce Clause." Id. at 2248-49.
23. For a more detailed description of the proposed contract and its statutory and
regulatory basis, see id. at 2239.
24. Five members of the Court-the Chief Justice and Justices Brennan, Blackmun,
Stevens, and Powell-joined Justice White's opinion with respect to the authorization
issue. Id. at 2238. The two dissenters, Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor, argued that the
Ninth Circuit decision should be affirmed on the basis of the market-participant doctrine
without expressing a position on the authorization question. Id. at 2248-49 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
25. Justices White, Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 2238. Justice Powell,
joined by the Chief Justice, preferred that the case be remanded to the Court of Appeals
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"It allows a State to impose burdens on commerce within the market
in which it is a participant, but allows it to go no further. ' 26 So limited,
the doctrine did not permit a state to "impose conditions, whether by
statute, regulation, or contract, that have a substantial regulatory effect
outside of that particular market. ' 27 Applying this test to the Alaska
statute before the Court, Justice White found it invalid because the state
was "using its leverage in [the timber] market, to exert a regulatory
2s
effect in the processing market in which it is not a participant.1
Justice White suggested two "sound reasons" for his test that distinguished "between a State's preferring its own residents in the initial
disposition of goods . . . and a State's attachments of restrictions on
'29
dispositions subsequent to the goods coming to rest in private hands.
In the first place, he argued that "intuition" suggested-and the common
law doctrine of restraints on alienation as well as the antitrust law's
prohibitions against vertical restraints confirmed-that a state has a
"greater interest as a 'private trader' in the immediate transaction than
it has in what the purchaser does with the goods after the State no
longer has an interest in them." 30 As a second justification for his limit
on the market-participant exception, Justice White declared that "downstream restrictions have a greater regulatory effect than do limitations
on the immediate transaction" because in the latter situation the state
is "restricting the post-purchase activity of the purchaser, rather than
3
merely the purchasing activity." '
Because Justice White's opinion on the market-participant issue failed
to attract a majority of the Court, predictions regarding its long-term
significance are particularly risky. Nonetheless, the opinion seems likely
to attract a majority when it reappears before the present Court. Only
two justices actually dissented on the market-participant issue, and an
endorsement of Justice White's approach by either of the justices who
declined to reach the issue would make it a majority position. Moreover,
Justice Marshall did not participate in South-Central Timber, so his vote

for initial consideration of the market participation issues.
After concluding that the market-participant doctrine was inapplicable, the plurality
concluded by analyzing the Alaska contract "under ordinary Commerce Clause principles."
Relying on the "rule of virtual per se invalidity" for protectionist measures, the plurality
had little difficulty concluding the measure was unconstitutional, especially since the Alaska
provision was subject to the "more rigorous and searching scrutiny" applicable to restrictions burdening foreign commerce. Id. at 2247.
26. Id. at 2245.
27. Id.at 2245-46.
28. Id.at 2246.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31.

Id.
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would also be sufficient to define the Court's majority on the question.

Since he previously joined Justice Brennan's dissent from the 1976
decision on which White was based, 3 2 it seems reasonable to anticipate

that he will join future efforts to confine that decision to its particular
facts.
The foregoing prediction of the Court's current division on the
market-participant issue indicates that Justice White's opinion is likely

to provide the basis for clarifying the market-participant doctrine over
the next few years. If this assessment is correct, both the underlying
justification for the result which he advocated and the language of the
opinion suggest that, although White will not be overruled, it will be

narrowly confined to its public works context. The basis for the emphatic
refusal to include post-sale restrictions within the exception appears to

be a desire to confine the exception to granting governmental entities
a choice of "trading partners," 33 an approach that would also preclude
"up-stream" or prepurchase conditions when the state is acting as a

purchaser rather than a seller. Similarly, at least two other aspects of
Justice White's opinion also indicate that the Court will normally limit
the market-participant exception to direct contractual preferences: (1)
the consistent condemnation of the "regulatory" impact of "downstream

restrictions;

34

and (2) the narrow reading of White that distinguishes

it on the ground that the workers on construction projects funded by

the city were, "in a substantial if informal sense, 'working for the
city.'

-35

The other decision limiting White's impact was United Building and
Construction Trades Council v. Mayor.3 6 The preference challenged in
United Building and Construction Trades Council was a Camden, New

32. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 817, 96 S. Ct. 2488, 2501
(1976) (Brennan, J.,dissenting joined by White and Marshall, JJ.).
33. 104 S. Ct. at 2244 (explaining the basis of the decision in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,
447 U.S. 429, 100 S. Ct. 2271 (1980)); 104 S. Ct. at 2246 (stating the initial reason
justifying the limit to the market-participant doctrine proposed by the plurality).
34. 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46 ("[Ilt is clear that the State is more than merely a seller
of timber . . . . The State may not impose conditions . . . that have a substantial
regulatory effect outside of that particular market. . . . [D]ownstream restrictions have
a greater regulatory effect than do limitations on the immediate transaction.").
35. Id. at 2244; see also id. at 2246 n.10.
36. 104 S. Ct. 1020 (1984). Justice Blackmun was the lone dissenter. Id. at 1030-37.
He did not reach the question of whether the privileges and immunities clause applied
when the state acted as a market participant because he concluded that the privileges and
immunities clause should not be applied to discriminations that were based on municipal,
rather, than state, residency. In his view, the contrary position conflicted with the intent
of the framers, the language of prior decisions, and the functional considerations that
prompted adoption of the privileges and immunities clause as well as with the text of
the clause itself. According to Justice Blackmun, the historical record demonstrated that

1984]

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84

Jersey ordinance 7 whose substantive provisions were similar to those of
the mayoral order" that White had held was immune from commerce
clause scrutiny. The opponents of the Camden ordinance abandoned
their commerce clause attack following the White decision. They continued, however, to press their claim that the ordinance violated the
privileges and immunities clause, and the Supreme Court accepted that
argument in part. More precisely, United Building and Construction
Trades Council held that the privileges and immunities clause limited a
city's authority to require that contractors for public works projects
prefer city residents when employing workers on those projects, but the
Court refused to decide whether the Camden ordinance violated the
clause. Instead, it remanded the case for the development of an adequate
factual record to permit a determination of whether the preference was
permissible.
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion began its analysis by rejecting
the city's argument that the privileges and immunities clause was inapplicable because the ordinance discriminated on the basis of municipal
residency rather than state citizenship. 9 Relying on past cases that had
the framers of the Constitution were not concerned with discriminations based on municipal
residency. Moreover, the reason for this lack of concern was completely reasonable: the
framers were unconcerned about the problem because they "had every reason to believe
that intrastate discrimination based on municipal residence could and would be dealt with
by the States themselves in the [rare] cases where it persisted." Id. at 1032. In light of
this historical background, Justice Blackmun was "hardly . . . surprisfed]" that past
decisions had failed to suggest that municipal discriminations fell within the purview of
the clause. Id. at 1032. Indeed he argued that the rationale of those decisions called for
the Court to refuse to extend the clause to cover discriminations based on municipal
residency. To extend the cases in that fashion would, he contended, contradict "the
underlying assumption" of those cases that the constitutionality of a particular statute
under the privileges and immunities clause turns on whether the statute deprives nonresidents of benefits enjoyed in common by all state residents simply by virtue of their
residence. Id. at 1033. He also contended that the Court's approach ignored "the functional
considerations that underlie the ... Clause," particularly the belief that "state parochialism
is likely to go unchecked by state political processes when those who are disadvantaged
are by definition disenfranchised as well." Id. at 1034. Because "discriminations on the
basis of municipal residence penalizeld] persons within the State's political community as
well as those without," the majority's application of the clause to those types of discrimination ignored "the political ills it was designed to cure." Id. at 1034-35. Finally,
he noted that nothing in the text of the clause is "phrased solely in terms of state
citizenship." Id. at 1036. Thus, the language did not compel the majority's expansive
reading that ignored the history, precedent, and purpose of the provision being construed.
37. At the time of the Supreme Court decision in United Building & Construction
Trades Council, the Camden ordinance required that contractors on publicly financed
projects "make 'every good faith effort' to comply" with the "goal" of ensuring that
city residents make up at least 40076 of the labor force. Id. at 1025.
38. For a description of the mayoral order challenged in White, see 103 S. Ct. at
1043 n.l.
39. He also rejected the suggestion that the clause only applied to state statutes, not

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

applied the clause to invalidate territorial discriminations 40 and that had
treated the terms "citizen" and "resident" as "essentially interchangeable" under the clause 4 ' Justice Rehnquist refused to read the clause
"so literally." Focusing instead on the actual impact of the ordinance,
he concluded that its effect on those outside the state was sufficient to
trigger the protections of the privileges and immunities clause. Because
a nonresident of the state will always be a nonresident of a city within
that state, conditioning a privilege on municipal residency has the same
exclusionary effect as a requirement of state residency, and this exclusionary effect is sufficient to invoke the clause. Turning specifically to
the Camden ordinance, Justice Rehnquist explained that it triggered
privileges and immunities clause scrutiny because it did not give "an
out-of-state citizen who ventures into New Jersey . .. the same privileges
as a New Jersey citizen residing in Camden."42
Having determined that the privileges and immunities clause covers
discriminations based on municipal residency, the Court next turned to
the question of whether the Camden ordinance violated the clause.
Resolution of that issue entailed a "two-step inquiry": (1) deciding
"whether the ordinance burdens one of those privileges and immunities
protected by the Clause; ' 43 and (2) determining whether "there is a
'substantial reason' for the difference in treatment. ' 44 The Court gave
an affirmative response to the first step of the analysis, but deferred a
definitive ruling on the second step until the state courts had developed
a more complete record.
In recent years, the Court has ruled that the privileges and immunities
clause only protects those interests of nonresidents that are 'fundamental' to the promotion of interstate harmony. ' 45 Chief among the
municipal ordinances. In the first place, "one cannot easily distinguish municipal from
state action" in the case of the Camden ordinance because "the municipal ordinance
would not have gone into effect without express approval by the State Treasurer." 104
S. Ct. at 1025. But even "more fundamentally, a municipality is merely a political
subdivision of the State from which its authority derives," and the Constitution does not
permit "that [which] would be unconstitutional if done directly by the State .... [to] be
accomplished by a city deriving its authority from the State." Id. at 1026.
40. Id. (citing Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952)). For a criticism of this
citation of Mullaney, see 104 S. Ct. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. 104 S. Ct. at 1026 (citing Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8
(1975)).
42. 104 S. Ct. at 1027. Although Justice Rehnquist conceded "that New Jersey
residents not residing in Camden will [also] be affected by the ordinance," he refused to
create a rule immunizing local action "from constitutional review at the behest of outof-state residents merely because some in-state residents are similarly disadvantaged." Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.at 1029.
45. Id. at 1027-28 (quoting Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371, 388 (1978)).
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interests that have been found fundamental enough to merit constitutional protection is the privilege of pursuing "a common calling."46
Thus, the Court's analysis in United Building and Construction Trades
Council focused on whether the interest affected by the Camden ordinance (the privilege of working for contractors who are working on
municipally funded projects) was sufficiently analogous to the pursuit
of a common calling to fall within the protections of the privileges and
immunities clause.
The Court has never directly determined whether access to government employment is an interest protected by the privileges and immunities
clause. Nonetheless, such a holding would seem to contradict various
decisions of the 1970's that rejected equal protection claims premised
on a "fundamental right" to public employment. 47 Furthermore, since
White premised its market-participation exception to the dormant commerce clause on the perception that everyone who is employed on a
city works project is, " 'in a substantial if informal sense, "working
for the city," ' "48 the natural argument for the city was to claim that
those who worked on projects funded by the city were also "informal"
city employees for purposes of the privileges and immunities clause.
Despite the logical attractiveness of this argument, the Court rejected
it on the ground that the city's position called for "mechanically"
to the
transferring "an analysis fashioned to fit the Commerce Clause"
49
very different context of the privileges and immunities clause.
The Court justified its refusal to transfer the market-participant
exception from the commerce clause into privileges and immunities clause
analysis on the ground that the two provisions "have different aims
and set different standards for state conduct."' 0 One purpose of the
commerce clause is to restrain the regulatory powers of the state by
establishing the "superior [regulatory] authority of Congress . . . in
matters involving interstate commerce."" In light of this purpose, the
commerce clause distinction between market participation and market
regulation was a logical one because no regulatory conflict can arise

46. 104 S. Ct. at 1028 (citing Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S.
371 (1978); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S.
656 (1975); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385
(1948); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 418 (1871)).
47. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 96 S.
Ct. 1154 (1976); Detroit Police Officer Ass'n v. City of Detroit, 405 U.S. 950, 92 S. Ct.
1173 (1972).
48. See 104 S. Ct. at 1028 (quoting White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr.
Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983)).
49. 104 S. Ct. at 1028.

50.

Id.

51.

Id.
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"when the State acts solely as a market participant. 5 2 By contrast, the
privileges and immunities clause restricts state power "in the interests
of interstate harmony." 53 Its concern is limiting "discrimination against
out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern," not delineating the limits of regulatory authority. 4 As a result, its limitations
apply whether the state is acting as a market participant or a market
regulator.
In summarizing this rationale for rejecting a market-participation
exception to the privileges and immunities clause, Justice Rehnquist
reiterated that the "determination of whether a privilege is 'fundamental' (not "whether the employees of private contractors . . . engaged
in public works contracts can or cannot be said to be 'working for the
city' ") is the crucial factor in deciding whether the protections of the
privileges and immunities clause apply." He then proceeded to define
the activity affected by the Camden ordinance as "the opportunity to
seek employment with private employers." 5 6 So defined, the activity was
"sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation" to fall within the
scope of cases protecting "the pursuit of a common calling" and to
require that the ordinance meet the standards of the privileges and
immunities clause.
Of course, the privileges and immunities clause does not preclude
all discrimination that affects "fundamental" privileges. It allows "discrimination against citizens of other States where there is a 'substantial
reason' for the difference in treatment. 5 7 To determine whether a
particular discrimination is permissible thus requires analysis of "whether
such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination bears a
close relation to them." 58 In effect, the entity responsible for the discrimination must show that nonresidents " 'constitute a peculiar source
of the evil at which the ordinance is aimed.' "19
Although the city of Camden claimed that its ordinance was constitutional even if the limitations of the privileges and immunities clause
applied, s° the Supreme Court declined to resolve that question. Because

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1029.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
59. 104 S. Ct. at 1029-30 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
60. Camden argued that "its ordinance is necessary to counteract grave economic
and social ills" including "[s]piralling unemployment, a sharp decline in population, and
a dramatic reduction in the number of businesses located in the city." The hiring preference
would, the city contended, help alleviate these problems by "increas[ing] the number of
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it found that the existing record provided an inadequate basis for evaluating Camden's justification, the Court remanded the case to the state
61
courts for the development of a more complete factual record.
On initial reading, the practical impact of South-Central Timber
Development and United Buildings and Construction Trades Council
seems to be to limit White so substantially as to amount to a de facto
overruling of the earlier decision. In refusing to permit Alaska to require
in-state processing of timber owned by the state, the South-Central
plurality clearly rejected the suggestion that White empowers local governments to use their market power as they see fit. By emphasizing the
sense in which those who work on public works projects can be seen
as "informal" employees of the government and by narrowly defining
the justification for the market-participation exception as protecting the
government's right to choose its "trading partners," the plurality indicated that the market-participation exception normally does not extend
to "downstream" or "upstream" restrictions that restrict the trading
partner's actions before or after the particular transaction that is the
focus of the contract. Similarly, United Building and Construction Trades
Council further confined White by recognizing an alternate constitutional
limit that applies even for preferences that qualify for the marketparticipant exception to the dormant commerce clause. As a practical
matter then, the combined effect of White and the 1984 decisions appears, at first glance, to be negligible: the recognition of a narrow right
to choose trading partners free from the "reasonableness" scrutiny of
the commerce clause coupled with the imposition of the similar "substantial reason" review of the privileges and immunities clause even for
the small group of decisions that escape commerce clause review.
The analysis outlined in the preceding paragraph is deficient in two
respects. First, it overstates the similarity of the relevant tests under the
commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause. At the same
time, it ignores the extent to which an expanded privileges and immunities
clause could serve as the basis for renewed challenges to residency
preferences for local government employment.
The tests under the two clauses differ because the Court would
probably not use a "reasonableness" test in situations where a local

employed persons residing in Camden and .. .arrest[ing] the 'middle class flight' currently
plaguing the city." 104 S. Ct. at 1030.
61.
It would not be appropriate for this Court either to make factual determinations
as an initial matter or to take judicial notice of Camden's decay. We, therefore,
deem it wise to remand the case to the New Jersey Supreme Court. That court
may decide, consistent with state procedures, on the best method for making
the necessary findings.
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government's preference for its own residents did not qualify for the
market-participant exception to the dormant commerce clause. Although
recent decisions have generally used the reasonableness test in evaluating
commerce clause challenges to state and local regulations, 62 the Court
has declined to apply that standard to measures that discriminate against
interstate commerce. When discrimination against interstate commerce
'63
is involved, the Court has invoked a "rule of virtual per se invalidity.
Because preferences for local residents constitute discrimination against
interstate commerce, 64 they would have fallen within the per se rule and
would almost certainly have been invalidated.
In light of this different treatment for discrimination against interstate commerce, the combined impact of White, South-Central Timber
Development, and United Building and Construction Trades Council is
more subtle. When a local government is "choosing its own trading
partners" or controlling the labor force on publicly financed construction
projects, it escapes the per se rule of the commerce clause but must
still justify its preference under the "substantial reason" standard of
the privileges and immunities clause. In effect then, the three decisions
allow local preferences within a narrowly defined area but only when
the local government can convince a court that the preference serves
important local interests.
In addition to providing an alternative constitutional standard for
reviewing the contractual preferences that White had immunized from
Commerce Clause scrutiny, United Building and Construction Trades
Council also provides a new basis for renewed challenges to residency
preferences for local government employment. Past decisions have denied
equal protection challenges to these preferences on the lack of a "right
to public employment. ' 65 But Justice Rehnquist did not rely on a privilege of employment as the basis for applying the privileges and immunities clause in United Building and Construction Trades Council.
Instead, he defined the relevant privilege as the "opportunity to seek

62. See, e.g., Arkansas Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Pub. Util. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
375, 103 S. Ct. 1905 (1983); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101
S. Ct. 715 (1981). But cf. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 101
S. Ct. 1309 (1981) (A divided court was unable to achieve a majority with respect to the
applicable standard for reviewing highway safety regulations.).
63. South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 2247 (1984) (citing
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). See also Sporhase v.
Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982); New England Power Co. v. New
Hampshire, 455 U.S. 33i, 102 S. Ct. 1096 (1982); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
99 S. Ct. 1727 (1979).
64. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 71 S. Ct. 295 (1951); see also United
Building and Constr. Trades Council v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 1020, 1037 n.16 (1984).
65. See supra note 17.
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employment with . . . private employers." 6 When the privilege is thus
defined in terms of the "opportunity" of seeking employment rather
than of a right to employment, it is difficult to see why it should be
confined to employment with private employers. By expanding the privilege to encompass the opportunity to seek public employment as well,
the Court could provide privileges and immunities clause review of the
employment preferences of local governments without upsetting its equal
protection decisions limiting the "fundamental rights" protected by the
67
Constitution.
Such an expansion would, of course, involve a tragic irony. In
essence, a Court that has relied on concepts of judicial restraint to avoid
forcing middle class communities to accommodate the poor and
minorities 6 would be using the techniques of judicial activism 69 to overturn attempts by poor and minority communities to preserve their limited
resources for themselves. Inconsistency with its claims about judicial
restraint has not, however, deterred the Court from activism in other
areas where it was vindicating the claims of property owners and commercial interests. 70 Thus, only time will tell whether the Court will make
use of the expansive potential of its new privileges and immunities clause
doctrine.

Sign Regulations
Decisions of the last several years have induced much uncertainty
over the extent to which a local government can restrict the use of signs

66. 104 S. Ct. at 1029.
67. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct.
1278 (1973) (holding that strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause only applies to
classifications affecting rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution).
68. See, e.g., Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
97 S. Ct. 555 (1977) (holding that zoning ordinances are not invalid under the equal
protection clause merely because they have a disproportionate impact on the poor or on
minority group members); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975) (The
poor and members of minority groups lack standing to challenge the town's exclusionary
zoning practices.).
69. Justice Blackmun's dissent, 104 S. Ct. at 1030-37, offers a convincing demonstration that United Building & Construction Trades Council amounted to a significant
expansion of the text of the privileges and immunities clause and of the prior decisions
construing the clause.
70. See, e.g., Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannus, 438 U.S. 234, 98 S. Ct. 2716
(1978) (voiding, under the contract clause, a Minnesota statute that required employers
who closed plants in Minnesota to provide pensions for all employees who had worked
for the employer for ten years or more); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98
S. Ct. 1407 (1978) (holding that a Massachusetts statute limiting the ability of corporations
to spend money in political campaigns violated the First Amendment rights of the corporation); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 98 S. Ct. 787 (1978)
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within its borders. In 1977, Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Town of
Willingboro7' held that a local government's ban on the display of "For
Sale" signs within residential neighborhoods violated the First Amend-

ment. Then, four years later, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego72
invalidated, on First Amendment grounds, a San Diego ordinance that
banned almost all forms of advertising using fixed-structure signs except

for "on-site" commercial advertising (that is, signs advertising goods or
services available on the property where the sign is located). The Court
failed, however, to produce a majority opinion in Metromedia, and this
failure caused considerable confusion about the proper framework for
analyzing local sign regulations.
Near the end of the 1983 term, the Court began the process of
eliminating the ambiguity engendered by Linmark and Metromedia. In
City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent," a majority of the Court

joined an opinion that emphatically affirmed a city's authority to rely
on esthetic considerations as the basis for sign regulations. But the
ordinance before the Court in Taxpayers was a relatively narrowly drawn
one that was content-neutral, so one should not read the Taxpayers
opinion as a signal that the Court is abandoning the close scrutiny of
Linmark and Metromedia.
The Los Angeles ordinance challenged in Taxpayers forbade the
posting of signs on public property. The plaintiffs were a group of

(striking down an Iowa statute limiting the size of trucks as violative of the dormant
commerce clause).
71. 431 U.S. 85, 97 S. Ct. 1614 (1977).
72. 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981).
73. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. In
an opinion that the other two dissenters joined, Justice Brennan argued that the Court
should "exercise special care" when reviewing governmental regulations "when a purely
aesthetic objective is asserted to justify a restriction of speech." Id. at 2138. Because
"aesthetic interests are easy for a city to assert and difficult for a court to assess,"
perfunctory review would allow cities to use aesthetic interest as a mechanism for restricting
freedom of speech. Id. To counteract that possibility, he proposed the following test,
"(a] total ban on an important medium of communication may be upheld only if the .
. . ban (1) furthers a substantial governmental objective, and (2) constitutes the least
speech-restrictive means of achieving that objective." Id. at 2139.
To give substance to the test he proposed, Justice Brennan would-at least when "a
total ban is imposed on a particularly valuable method of communication"-require that
the government "provide tangible proof of the legitimacy and substantiality of its aesthetic
objective." Id. at 2141. In addition, he would accept aesthetic objectives as a justification
for restrictions of First Amendment freedoms "only if the government demonstrates that
it is pursuing an identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are
unrelated to the restriction of speech." Id. Without such a showing by the city of Los
Angeles, he would have ruled that its "total ban sweeps so broadly and trenches completely
on [the plaintiffs'] use of an important medium of political expression that it must be struck
down as violative of the First Amendment." Id. at 2142-43.
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supporters of a candidate for a position on the city council and a
company the supporters had engaged to fabricate and to post signs for
the candidate. When the city removed the signs that the company had
attached to municipal utility poles, the plaintiffs initiated a judicial
challenge claiming that the ordinance requiring the removal violated their
First Amendment rights.
The Supreme Court had little difficulty in denying the plaintiffs'
challenge to the ordinance on its face. Initially, the Court rebuffed an
"overbreadth" challenge to the ordinance as inappropriate. 74 Because
the record did not indicate "that the ordinance applies to any conduct
more likely to be protected by the First Amendment" than the signs
displayed by the plaintiffs, the opponents of the ordinance had failed
to establish the basic element of an overbreadth challenge-demonstrating
"a realistic danger that the ordinance will significantly compromise
recognized First Amendment protections of individuals not before the
Court. '75 Moreover, once the overbreadth challenge had been rejected,
the Court quickly disposed of the suggestion that the ordinance was
invalid on its face because "the City's interest in eliminating visual blight
'76
[was] not sufficiently weighty to justify an abridgement of speech."
Even the plaintiffs conceded "that the ordinance serves safety interests
in many of its applications." 7 The Court concluded, therefore, that the
plaintiffs' claim was "basically a challenge to the ordinance as applied
to their activities, ' 78 and it focused the remainder of its opinion on
that challenge.
Although Justice Stevens' majority opinion acknowledged that the
ordinance's application to the activity involved in Taxpayers implicated
First Amendment interests, he ultimately concluded that the city's action
did not violate the First Amendment. Inasmuch as "there [was] not
even a hint of bias or censorship in the City's enactment or enforcement
of this ordinance," the city's action did not violate the "general principle
that . . . forbids the government from regulating speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others." ' 79 Instead, the
applicable standard was that contained in United States v. O'Brien.80 It
upholds content-neutral regulations when they satisfy four requirements:
(1) the subject of the regulation falls within the government's constitutional power; (2) the regulations further an important governmental
interest; (3) the governmental interest they serve is unrelated to the
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 2127.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 2127-28.
Id.at 2128.
391 U.S. 367. 88 S. Ct. 1673 (1968).
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suppression of free expression; and (4) any incidental restrictions on
alleged First Amendment freedoms are no greater than is essential to
the governmental interest served by the regulation.
The Taxpayer plaintiffs acknowledged that the esthetic purposes
allegedly served by the ordinance were "within the constitutional power
of the City" and were "basically unrelated to the suppression of ideas."'
As a result, the Court's application of the O'Brien test focused on its
remaining two elements: whether the city's interest in improving its
appearance was "sufficiently substantial to justify the effect of the
ordinance on the [plaintiffs'] rights of expression, and whether that
'8 2
effect was no greater than necessary to accomplish the City's purpose.
With respect to the question of whether the city's interest was
important enough to justify the impact of the ordinance, Justice Stevens
claimed that past decisions had established that "municipalities have a
weighty, essentially esthetic interest in proscribing intrusive and unpleasant formats for expression." 3 Furthermore, he asserted that a majority
of the Court had recognized in Metromedia that a "city's interest in
avoiding visual clutter . . . was sufficient to justify a prohibition of
billboards.1 8 4 In light of these precedents, the Taxpayer majority reaffirmed that the city's interest in avoiding "the visual assault on the
citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted
on public property" was sufficient to satisfy the third prong of the
O'Brien test.85
The Court then turned to the fourth requirement of O'Brien, insuring
that the "incidental restriction" that the ordinance imposed on First
Amendment freedoms was not "substantially broader than necessary to
protect the city's interest in eliminating visual clutter.' 1'86 According to
Justice Stevens, this aspect of the O'Brien test required only that the
ordinance be "narrowly tailored to serve [the city's] interest;" if the
ordinance satisfied this requirement, any "incidental restriction on expression" it imposed was justifiable "as a reasonable regulation of the time,
place, or manner of expression." 87 Moreover, he also concluded that
81.

104 S. Ct. at 2129.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 2130 (citing Erznonznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 n.5,
95 S. Ct. 2268, 2273 n.5 (1975)); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 30203, 94 S. Ct. 2714, 2717 (1974) (plurality opinion); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69
S. Ct. 448 (1949).
84. 104 S. Ct. at 2130 (citing Metromedia Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,
at 507-08 (1981) (plurality opinion); id. at 552, 101 S. Ct. at 2915 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
id. at 559-61, 101 S. Ct. at 2919-21 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570, 101 S. Ct. at
2924-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
85. 104 S. Ct. at 2130.
86. Id.

87.

Id.

1984]

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84

the Los Angeles ordinance satisfied this requirement because its ban on
'
signs eliminated "the exact source of the evil it sought to remedy." 88
The ordinance responded "precisely to the substantive problem which
legitimately concerns the City," and thus it curtailed "no more speech
'89
than [was] necessary to accomplish its purpose.
After completing this analysis based on O'Brien, Justice Stevens'
opinion concluded by rejecting four additional arguments advanced by
opponents of the Los Angeles ordinance. First, it categorically denied
the claim that "a prohibitibn against the use of unattractive signs cannot
be justified on esthetic grounds if it fails to apply to all equally unattractive signs wherever they might be located." 9 To the contrary, a
reasonableness test applies here as well; content-neutral distinctions are
permissible whenever the local government "could reasonably conclude
that the esthetic interest was outweighed by the countervailing interest
in one kind of advertising even though it was not outweighed by the
other." 9' Second, the majority refused to apply various decisions that
had invalidated restrictions on particular types of expressive activity
when "the remaining mode of communications were inadequate. ' 92 In

the view of the majority, those cases were inapplicable because "nothing
in the findings of the district court indicates that the posting of political

88. Id. at 2137.
89. Id. at 2140. On this ground, the majority distinguished Schneider v. New Jersey,
308 U.S. 147, 60 S. Ct. 196 (1939), which had invalidated a municipal ordinance banning
the distribution of leaflets on public streets and sidewalks. "[A]n anti-littering statute
could have addressed the substantive evil [involved in Schneider] without prohibiting
expressive activity," and thus "application of the prophylactic rule actually employed
gratuitously infringed upon the right of an individual to communicate directly with a
willing listener." By contrast, the signs posted by the Taxpayers did not produce "the
substantive evil-visual blight"-as "a possible by-product." The "medium of expression
itself" created the evil. It was, therefore, subject to reasonable, content-neutral regulation.
Id. at 2132.
90. Id.
91. Id. (citing Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 511, 512 (plurality opinion); id. at 541 (Stevens,
J. dissenting); id. at 563-64 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)).
Justice Stevens gave the following explanation of why the Los Angeles ordinance satisfied
this reasonableness test:
So here, the validity of the esthetic interest in the elimination of signs on public
property is not compromised by failing to extend the ban to private property.
The private citizen's interest in controlling the use of his own property justifies
the disparate treatment. Moreover, by not extending the ban to all locations,
a significant opportunity to communicate by means of temporary signs is preserved, and private property owners' esthetic concerns will keep the posting of
signs on their property within reasonable bounds. Even if some visual blight
remains, a partial, content-neutral ban may nevertheless enhance the City's
appearance.
104 S. Ct. at 2132.
92. 104 S. Ct. at 2133.
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posters on public property is a uniquely valuable or important mode of
communication" or that the ability of the plaintiffs "to communicate
effectively is threatened by ever-increasing restrictions on expression." 93
Third, the Court also rejected the claim that the public property covered
by the ordinance should be treated as a "public forum" open to public
debate. Reliance on the public forum doctrine was "misplaced" because

of the lack of "a traditional right of access respecting such items as
utility poles for purposes of their communication comparable to that

recognized for public streets and parks."

94

'In the absence of such a

tradition, "public property . . .may be reserved . . . 'for its intended
purposes,' "9 so long as any regulations that impact on free speech are

both reasonable and content-neutral. Fourth, the Court declined to invalidate the ordinance on the ground that it could be modified to have
a "less severe effect" on the plaintiffs' expressive activity. 96 Although
"plausible public policy arguments" could be made to support some of
the plaintiffs' suggestions, 97 the Court refused to impose any of them
as a constitutional mandate. To the contrary, it expressly recognized
the city's power to "decide that the esthetic interest in avoiding 'visual

' 98
clutter' justifies a removal of signs creating or increasing that clutter.
The Taxpayers opinion should be a welcome one for local governments. In essence, it reaffirms that they retain a significant degree of

regulatory authority over sign regulations that have the potential to

infringe on First Amendment freedoms. For one thing, it confirms recent
decisional trends limiting the scope of the overbreadth and public function doctrines. At the same .time, it unequivocally endorses a reasonableness test for evaluating content-neutral regulations that impose only

"incidental"

restrictions on expressive activity.

93. Id.
94. Id.at 2134.

95.

Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,

43 (1948)).

96. 104 S. Ct. at 2134.
97. Id. at 2135. The Court noted, however, that certain of the exceptions proposed
by the plaintiffs might not be constitutionally permissible:
For example, even though political speech is entitled to the fullest possible
measure of constitutional protection, there are a host of other communications
that command the same respect. An assertion that "Jesus Saves", that "Abortion
is Murder", that every woman has the "Right to Choose", or that "Alcohol
Kills", may have a claim to a constitutional exemption from the ordinance that
is just as strong as "Robert Vincent-City Council." . . . To create an exception
for appellees' political speech and not these other types of speech mighi create
a risk of engaging in constitutionally forbidden content discrimination. . ..
Moreover, the volume of permissible postings under such a mandated exemption
might so limit the ordinance's effect as to defeat its aim of combatting visual
blight.
Id. (citations omitted).
98. Id.at 2135.
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Even though the overbreadth and public function portions of Taxpayers are consistent with other recent decisions, they are still important.
For example, the majority could have summarily rejected the overbreadth
doctrine challenge on the basis of its conclusion that the plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate that the Los Angeles ordinance "applies to any
conduct more likely to be protected by the First Amendment than their
own." 99 Instead, Justice Stevens took pains to emphasize that the overbreadth doctrine would have required more than a showing that the
ordinance affected some other conduct protected by the First Amendment. By reiterating that the overbreadth doctrine required a "substantial" danger that the regulation will inhibit the speech of third parties
not before the Court,'00 Taxpayers effectively documented the present
Court's determination to ensure that the doctrine remains a narrow
exception to "the general rule that a litigant only has standing to
vindicate his own constitutional rights."'' Similarly, the "public forum"
section of the Taxpayers opinion emphatically confirms the Court's
continuing rejection of the argument that the First Amendment guarantees access to all property owned by 'the government. As defined by
the present Court, the public forum doctrine only applies to areas to
which the public has had "a traditional right of access .. .for purposes

of communication." 10 2 In light of this limited definition, the public
forum concept will apparently affect local regulations only when they
deny access to property that has generally been available for expressive
activites in the past.
Perhaps the most important aspect of Taxpayers is the majority's
use of a "reasonableness" test to review the validity of sign regulations
designed to further esthetic goals. This result was not entirely unexpected
because a majority of the Court had endorsed such a standard in
individual opinions in Metromedia. But the potential majority of Metromedia could not agree on the proper result in that case, and so they
failed to produce a majority opinion. In effect then, Taxpayers joins
the potential majority of Metromedia into an actual majority that holds
the reasonableness standard applicable to sign regulations enacted for
esthetic reasons.
At least three features of the Taxpayers approach to sign regulations
deserve brief notation. First, the majority unequivocally affirmed the
validity of esthetic concerns as a basis for regulations which restrict

99. Id. at 2127.
100. Id. at 2126. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 772, 102 S. Ct. 3348, 3362
(1983); Broaderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 2916 (1973).
101. 104 S. Ct. at 2124.
102. Id. at 2134. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 103 S. Ct, 948 (1983); TJni'ed States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981).
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First Amendment freedoms. Second, the majority refused to establish
a special standard for reviewing regulations that are designed to serve
esthetic goals. So long as the regulations are content-neutral and do not
abolish "a uniquely important mode of communication"'' 03 or leave those
who use the mode with inadequate means of communication, the reasonableness standard that normally governs regulations of the time, place,
or manner of expressing First Amendment rights applies. Third, the
majority's application of the reasonableness test leaves considerable room
for local discretion. In particular, the Court refused to require that Los
Angeles choose the particular regulation with the least severe effect on
expressive activity. Recognizing that "plausible public policy arguments"
might well be made in support of various alternatives, the Taxpayers
majority refused to hold that any particular alternative was constitutionally mandated. Instead, it left the city free to decide whether "the
esthetic interest in avoiding 'visual clutter' justifies a removal of signs
creating or increasing that clutter."' 4
One should not, however, read Taxpayers as a complete abandonment of judicial oversight of local sign regulations. Indeed, a careful
reading of the majority opinion suggests a number of caveats for anyone
involved in drafting sign regulations. The first of these is obvious but
nonetheless merits comment because it is so fundamental. The Taxpayers
opinion premises its analysis on the content-neutrality of the Los Angeles
ordinance under attack. Any suggestion that a local ordinance will prefer
one viewpoint over another is almost certain to invalidate it as an
impermissible regulation of content. 0 As a second premise for its use
of the reasonableness standard, the Taxpayers majority emphasized that
the Los Angeles ordinance did not ban a "uniquely valuable or important
mode of communication" or leave the public with "inadequate" means
of communication.'0 6 The negative implication of this language indicates
that the Court would employ a stricter standard of review if those
challenging an ordinance demonstrated that it severely inhibited public
discussion of political or other issues. Finally, the flexibility of the
reasonableness standard used in Taxpayers should not obscure the substantial role it leaves for judicial review of particular regulations. The
reasonableness test is not a completely toothless standard for individual
cases. The government responsible for the regulation must still convince

103. 104 S. Ct. at 2133.
104. Id.at 2135.
105. Id. at 2128 ("The general principle that has emerged from [previous] cases is
that the First Amendment forbids the government from regulating speech in ways that
favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.").
106. Id. at 2133 (citing United States v: Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1702 (1983); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980); Linmark Assocs. v. Town of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977)).
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the reviewing court that the regulation will, in fact, serve the esthetic
goal that it is designed to achieve.
In sum, Taxpayers is an important decision confirming that local
governments have substantial authority to enact sign regulations that are
intended to improve the appearance of their communities. The authority
the Court has recognized is not unlimited, however. The regulations
must be content-neutral, they must leave the public with adequate means
of communication, and they must be reasonably designed to achieve
their esthetic purposes.
STATE-LOCAL

RELATIONS

The Louisiana Supreme Court's decisions concerning state power to
control the affairs of local governments send conflicting signals. In one
decision, the court refused to review a first circuit decision holding that
all local governments had to comply with state laws governing the wages
and working conditions of police officers. In the other, the court invalidated a state statute transferring control over Audubon Park to a
newly-created state agency as an unconstitutional taking of property
belonging to the city of New Orleans.
As last year's symposium article explained at length, 0 7 a major
ambiguity in the local government article of the Louisiana Constitution
concerns the state's power to control the wages and working conditions
of firefighters and police officers who are employed by local governments
with home rule charters. Article VI, section 6 prohibits the legislature
from enacting any legislation that has the effect of changing or altering
"the structure and organization" of a local government operating under
a home rule charter,10 8 and pre-1974 decisions'0 9 interpreted similar language in amendments to the 1921 constitution as precluding state control
over the pay of firefighters and police officers. But section 9 of article
VI expressly provides that the state's police power shall never be abridged
"[n]otwithstanding any provision" of the local government article," 0 and
section 14 expressly excepts firefighters and municipal police officers

107. See Murchison, supra note 3, at 389-401; see also Murchison, Developments in
the Law, 1980-1981 -Local Government Law, 42 La. L. Rev. 564, 573-75 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as Murchison, 1980-1981 Developments]; Murchison, Developments in the Law, 1979-

1980-Local Government Law, 41 La. L. Rev. 483, 485-86 (1981)

[hereinafter cited as

Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments].

108. Article VI, section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution provides: "The legislature
shall enact no law the effect of.which changes or affects the structure and organization
or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions of any local
governmental subdivision which operates under a home rule charter."
109. Letellier v. Jefferson Parish Police Jury, 254 La. 1067, 229 So. 2d 101 (1968);
La Fleur v. City of Baton Rouge, 124 So. 2d 374 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
110. La. Const. art. VI, § 9(b) ("Notwithstanding any provisions of this article, the
police power of the state shall never be abridged.").

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

from a separate provision limiting the effectiveness of laws that require
increased expenditures from local governments for certain employeerelated expenses.'
Decisions in the 1982-1983 term suggested that the state would prevail
on the issue, but the matter was still awaiting final resolution. Dicta in
recent supreme court opinions indicated that the state legislature retained
plenary control over the pay of firefighters and municipal police officers
except to the extent that section 14 limited that authority. 2 Moreover,
the second circuit had directly held that a city operating under a home
rule charter must comply with state statutes relating to the pay of police
officers, and the supreme court declined to review that decision. 113 The
supreme court had not, however, expressly addressed the question of
the allocation of power established by sections 6, 9, and 14; and the
matter was not entirely free from doubt." 4 Inasmuch as a case raising
the issue, Spillman v. City of Baton Rouge,"5 was pending at the time
last year's symposium article was written, the article concluded with the
hope that the supreme court would seize the opportunity to render a
definitive ruling on the issue.
Even though the court declined the opportunity presented by Spillman, the question now appears to have been resolved in favor of state
control. The first circuit eventually ruled in favor of state control, and

Ill.

Id. § 14:
No law requiring increased expenditures for wages, hours, working conditions,
pension and retirement benefits, vacation, or sick leave benefits of political
subdivision employees, except a law providing for civil service, minimum wages,
working conditions, and retirement benefits for firemen and municipal policemen,
shall become effective until approved by ordinance enacted by the governing
authority of the affected political subdivision or until the legislature appropriates
funds for the purpose to the affected political subdivision and only to the extent
and amount that such funds are provided. This Section shall not apply to a
school board.
112. See City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318, 1321 (La. 1983) ("The only
restriction on the State's power to enact legislation requiring the expenditure of funds by
local political subdivisions is found in Art. 6, § 4 .... ."); New Orleans Firefighters
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 412 So. 2d 402, 409 (La. 1982) (The fire and police
exception of Section 14 is "a positive reaffirmance of the plenary power of the legislature
to guarantee adequate fire and police protection for all citizens of Louisiana.").
113. Ruby v. City of Shreveport, 427 So. 2d 1267 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied,
433 So. 2d 154 (La. 1983). But see Tull v. City of Baton Rouge, 385 So. 2d 343 (La.
App. 1st Cir,), cert. denied, 392 So. 2d 663 (La. 1980) (The statute setting wage and
overtime requirements for municipal police officers does not apply to the city of Baton
Rouge.).
114. See Murchison, supra note 3, at 399-401.
115. 417 So. 2d 1212 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982), remanded, 430 So. 2d 92 (La. 1983),
decision on remand, 441 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d
1213 (La. 1984).
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the supreme court denied writs. 116 By this action, the court seems to
have succeeded in settling the issue for the present without ever directly
considering it. Although an exposition of the court's rationale would
have been desirable, the practical rule established by its pattern of dicta

and writ denials is relatively clear: the 1974 Constitution gives the state
paramount authority over the "civil service, minimum wages, working

conditions, and retirement benefits for firemen and municipal policemen"
even as to those local governments that were immune from state control
prior to the adoption of the new constitution."17
The Louisiana Supreme Court's other significant decision regarding
state-local relations during the 1983-1984 term was City of New Orleans
v. State." 8 Because it involved an appeal from a judgement declaring
a state statute unconstitutional, the court had to render a decision on
the merits," 9 and the decision it rendered granted local governments a
new protection from state control.
City of New Orleans invalidated the legislature's most recent attempt' 20
to place control over Audubon Park in the hands of a state agency
whose members are drawn from the entire New Orleans metropolitan
area. The 1983 Act' 2' challenged in City of New Orleans abolished the
existing park commission composed of New Orleans residents appointed
by the mayor 22 and transferred the park's property to a new commission
appointed by the governor and composed of residents of surrounding
parishes as well as the city. 23 According to the supreme court, the

116. 441 So. 2d 1243 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 446 So. 2d 1213 (La.
1984).
117. For an example of the impact of this resolution on the city of Baton Rouge,
the defendant in Spillman, see Morning Advocate (Baton Rouge), Oct. 5, 1984, at I-B,
col. 2 (The cost of paying back wages ordered by Spillman will exceed $5,000,000.).
118. 443 So. 2d 562 (La. 1983). Justice Dennis filed a concurring opinion in which
he declared that the 1983 statute violated Article VI, section 6 of the Louisiana Constitution
because it "interfere[d] with the internal management of local government by superceding
the city's power and function inherent in the management of its own immovable property."
Id. at 573. He also found the reservation of the state's police power, Article VI, section
9 inapplicable because "the subject of the statute at issue is not a matter of statewide
concern rightfully amenable to regulation by the state." Id. On the other hand, he termed
the majority's expropriation rationale "questionable" because it did "not alter the ownership or use of property" nor "involve a determination to pursue a public enterprise
utilizing land not then held by the public ....
".Id.
119. See La. Const. art. V, § 5(D)(1).
120. The supreme court had voided an earlier statute, section 2 of Act 352 of 1982,
on grounds that it was a local law that had not been advertised as required by the
constitution. City of New Orleans v. Treen, 431 So. 2d 390 (La. 1983), analyzed in
Murchison, supra note 3, at 386-89.
121. 1983 La. Acts, No. 485.
122. Id. § 2(A).
123. Id. § I (amending and reenacting La. R.S. 56:1761(B) (1983)); id. § 2(F).
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statute was unconstituional because its attempt to transfer property under
the control of the present commission amounted to a taking of city
property without compensation in violation of article I, section 4 of the
2 4
Louisiana Constitution.
The factual predicate for the City of New Orleans opinion was the
court's conclusion that the Audubon Park belonged to the city. To
support this conclusion, the court relied on the language of statutes
establishing the existing commission and its predecessors and authorizing
them to acquire property." 5 The language of those statutes, the court
declared, indicated that the body responsible for Audubon Park had
always been "an agency of the city rather than the state." Moreover,
in acquiring the property that forms the bulk of the present park, the
original park commissioners had "acted as agents of the City of New
Orleans," and the various entities responsible for controlling the park
over the years had "all exercise[d] control and dominion over the Park
on behalf of the City." Therefore, "[t]he city of New Orleans and not
the State owns the property occupied by the Audubon Park Aid Zoo,
' 26
as well as the improvements upon that property."'
Once the court had determined that the Audubon Park property
belonged to the city rather than to the state, it turned to the issue of
whether the state could take control of the property without compensating the city. According to City of New Orleans, the Audubon Park
statute violated the expropriation paragraph of the constitution, which
prohibits the state from taking "property . . .except for public purposes
and with just compensation paid to the owner.' '1 27 Unlike the expropriation provision of the 1921 Constitution 28 and the paragraph that
immediately precedes it in the 1974 Constitution, 29 the paragraph delineating the state's expropriation power does not use the adjective
124.

Article I, section 4 of the Louisiana Constitution provides:
Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and
dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions
except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or
into court for his benefit.
125. 443 So. 2d at 570-71 (citing 1979 La. Acts, No. 55; 1914 La. Acts, No. 191;
1877 La. Acts, No. 87; 1871 La. Acts, No. 83; 1870 La. Acts, No. 84).
126. 443 So. 2d at 571.
127. La. Const. art. 1, § 4, J 2. For the exact language of this paragraph, see supra
note 124.
128. La. Const. of 1921, art. I, § 2; see State v. City of New Orleans, 360 So. 2d
624 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 362 So. 1121 (La. 1978) (holding that the expropriation provision of 1921 constitution does not require the state to pay just compensation
when it takes the property of a local government).
129. La. Const. art. 1, § 4,
I. For the language of this paragraph, see supra note
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"private" to qualify the noun "property." This absence of the qualifying
adjective led the court to hold that the expropriation provision "relates
to all property, public and private" and "prohibits the state from taking
any property including public property owned by political subdivisions,
except upon payment of just compensation."'' 30 Because the law transferring Audubon Park's property to the state made no provision for
compensation of the city, it was an unconstitutional taking and the city
was entitled to judgment permanently enjoining the statute's implementation.
In City of New Orleans, the court seems to have reached the right
result for the wrong reason. Its factual premises-that Audubon Park
has always belonged to the city rather than to the state and that the
park commission has been part of the city's governmental structureare unexceptional; they probably accord with popular understanding as
well as the language of the statutes and deeds cited by the court. If
one accepts those premises, then the real defect of the 1983 statute is
the one suggested by Justice Dennis' concurrence; 3' that is, its incompatibility with article VI, section 6, which immunizes the structure and
organization of local governments with home rule charters from state
control.1 2 The most obvious aspect of this incompatibility is the section
of the statute abolishing the existing park commission, for that provision
directly eliminates a part of the city's governmental structure. But the
protection of section 6 extends beyond express changes in governmental
structure. It forbids the legislature from enacting laws which have the
"effect" of interfering with the local government's structure, and transferring control over the existing Audubon Park property would surely
have that effect. It would convert an important city commission into a
mere shell and allow the state to assume practical control over any
aspect of a local government's organization merely by transferring the
property that the commission, agency, or department controlled to a
new entity structured in the manner desired by the state.
Relying on article VI, section 6 rather than the expropriation paragraph to invalidate state laws that transfer control over property belonging to local governments could affect the outcome of future cases.
Even though the two approaches produce the same result with respect
to the Audubon Park statute, the protections afforded by the two
provisions nonetheless differ in ways that could produce divergent results
in other situations.
One important difference is the greater substantive protection afforded by article VI, section 6. This provision forbids all laws that have

130.
131.

443 So. 2d at 572.
Id. at 573.

132.

See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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the "effect" of interfering with the local government's structure and
organization.' 33 By contrast, the protection of the expropriation provision
is largely conditional. So long as the state is taking the property for a
public purpose, the constitution does not forbid the taking; it merely
requires 'the state to pay compensation. Thus, for example, the expropriation provision would allow the state to take the Audubon Park
property if it were willing to compensate the city for the value of the
property taken, whereas article VI, section 6 would not permit the state
to initiate an involuntary purchase of a portion of the city's structure
or organization.
A second important difference between the two provisions involves
the sizes of the classes they protect. The protections against state interference with structure and organization that are found in article VI,
section 6 only extend to municipalities and parishes operating under
home rule charters; other "local governmental subdivisions' ' 3 4 remain
creatures of the legislature and subject to its control.' 35 By contrast, in
holding the expropriation paragraph to cover public property, City of
New Orleans declared that its protections extended to all "political
subdivisions"' 36-a category that presumably includes not only all parishes and municipalities but even special districts that the legislature has
37
created and could abolish.'
Of course, the protections that the expropriation provision provides
to non-home rule local governments might be more apparant than real.
Unless the court expands the scope of the expropriation provision to
provide non-home rule local governments with a protection similar to
that furnished- to those with home rule charters by Article VI, section
6, the legislature could generally use its control over the structure and
organization of these local governments to achieve the results it desired.
Even though the state could not take the property of these governmental
entities, it could "restructure" them to give effective control over the
property to an agency more likely to administer it in accordance with
the legislature's wishes. For example, it would be fairly easy to use this

133. For the precise language of Article I, § 6, see supra note 108.
134. As used in the 1974 Constitution, the phrase "other local governmental subdivisions" encompasses those parishes and municipalities that have not adopted home rule
charters. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 7, 44(A).
135. See e.g., Rollins Envtl. Servs. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127,
1131 (La. 1979), analyzed in Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 107, at 48588.
136. 443 So. 2d at 572; but cf. id. ("The rights of local governmental entities are
protected by article VI, § 6.").. The 1974 Constitution distinguishes local "governmental"
subdivisions from local "political" subdivisions. Compare La. Const. art. VI, § 44(A)
with id. § 44(B).
137. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 19, 44(B).
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technique to change the composition of the Audubon Park commission
if New Orleans did not have a home rule charter. Instead of transferring
control over park property to a new state commission, the legislature
could simply "restructure" the present commission to include residents
from the surrounding parishes.""
As practical matter, the supreme court's decisions seem to have
solved for the present two local government issues-state control over
the pay of police, officers and firefighters and municipal ownership of
Audubon Park-that have sharply divided the Louisiana political community in the recent past. Unfortunately, the court's solutions of those
issues failed to articulate a clear and coherent theory of the status that
local governments enjoy under the Louisiana Constitution. Because statelocal conflicts tend to reappear with some frequency, 3 9 the court is
likely to have another opportunity to frame such a theory in the near
future. Hopefully, it will seize that opportunity and provide lawyers
concerned with local government law a useful framework with which
40
to evaluate future conflicts.1
TORT LIABILITY

If the volume of reported decisions provides a reliable guide, 1'4
potential tort liability remains an important legal issue for local governments. This section considers two issues that produced significant
amounts of litigation in the courts of appeal during 1983-1984: ascertaining the proper standards for evaluating claims based on malfunctioning or missing traffic signals and signs, and identifying the "employer"
of state officers who serve within designated local boundaries.

138. In effect, the legislature restructured the park commission on several occasions
before New Orleans obtained its present constitutional protection as a local government
with a home rule charter. E.g., 1914 La. Acts, No. 191; 1877 La. Acts, No. 87; 1870
La. Acts, No. 84.
139. The Louisiana Supreme Court has rendered at least one opinion in a case involving
such a conflict in four of the last five terms. See City of New Orleans v. State, 443 So.

2d 562 (La. 1983); City of New Orleans v. State, 426 So. 2d 1318 (La. 1983); New
Orleans Firefighters Assoc. v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 422 So. 2d 402 (La. 1982); State v.
Rollins Envtl. Servs., 398 So. 2d 1122 (La. 1981); West v. Allen, 382 So. 2d 924 (La.
1980); Rollins Envtl. Servs. v. lberville Parish Police Jury, 371 So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979).
140. The author's symposium articles over the last several years have tried to outline

the parameters of the 1974 Constitution's allocation of power
governments. See Murchison, supra note 3, at 389-93; Murchison,
supra note 107, at 573-75; Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments,
87.
141. During 1983-1984, Louisiana's appellate courts handed

between state and local
1980-1981 Developments,
supra note 107, at 485down opinions in more

than thirty tort cases involving local governments. For a partial listing of those decisions,

see the cases cited in the footnotes to this section as well as those cited in note 15 supra.
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Liability Standards for Traffic Signs and Signals
The discussions in this section of the last several symposia 42 have
recorded the impact of the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision to hold
local governments strictly liable under Civil Code article 2317143 for
damages resulting from the acts of defective things under their control.
That impact has probably been less substantial than some representatives
of local governments initially feared, largely because some subsequent
opinions seem to have incorporated negligence concepts into the determination of whether the thing causing the injury is "defective."'" The
court has, however, stopped short of merging the standard of 2317 with
the general negligence principle of article 2315,' 4 1 and the two approaches
can produce divergent analyses.' 46 One area in which the approaches
under the two articles differ is the liability of local governments for
malfunctioning or missing traffic signals or signs. A number of decisions
of the courts of appeal have struggled with that problem during the
past year.
Before the advent of 2317 liability, plaintiffs seeking to recover for
damages resulting from malfunctioning or missing traffic signals or signs
encountered numerous obstacles even after the sovereign immunity of
local governments was eliminated. Unless plaintiffs could show that the
signal or sign was malfunctioning or missing because of the local government's negligence, they had to base these claims on a failure to
repair or to replace the signal or sign. Of course, the local government's
duty to replace or to repair could arise only after it knew or should
have known of the problem and after it had a reasonable opportunity
to act on that knowledge. Because most accidents at intersections with
malfunctioning or missing signal or signs happened before the local
governments could reasonably respond to the situation, most plaintiffs
injured in accidents at those intersections were unable to recover.
Using the local government's lack of knowledge or constructive
knowledge as a reason to deny recovery frequently allowed the courts
to avoid the difficult question of whether the local government's breach
of its duty to replace or to repair should be regarded as the legal cause
142. See Murchison, supra note 3, at 402-05, Murchison, Developments in the Law,
1981-1982-Local Government Law, 43 La. L. Rev. 461, 483-86 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments); Murchison, 1980-1981 Developments, supra note
107, at 588-92.
143. Civil Code article 2317 provides: "We are responsible, not only for the damage
occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of . . . things which
we have in our custody."
144. E.g., Kent v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982); see Murchison,
supra note 3, at 402-04; Murchison, 1980-1981 Developments, supra note 107, at 591-92.
145. Civil Code article 2315 provides: "Every act whatever of man that causes damage
to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it."
146. See Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments, supra note 142, at 486.
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of a subsequent accident. Particularly, should the failure of the injured
party to follow the rules of the road that apply when traffic signs are
malfunctioning or missing bar recovery? In other words, does the injured
party's negligence preclude liability because the local government's duty
does not include the risk that the injured party would proceed negligently,
or is the injured party's negligence merely a contributing cause that now
reduces liability under the comparative negligence statute? 4 7 Similarly,
what if a third party acts negligently when confronted with the malfunctioning or missing signal or sign? Should the local government and
the third party both be legally responsible for the injured party's damages
or should the scope of the local government's duty be held to exclude
the risk that third parties would fail to act reasonably when confronted
with a malfunctioning or missing signal or sign?
Occasionally, plaintiffs succeeded in overcoming the knowledge hurdle. In those cases, Louisiana's appellate courts have divided over the
question of whether the subsequent negligence of another relieves the
governmental defendant from liability. Three recent opinions illustrate
the divergent approaches. In two cases, 48 the first circuit refused to
allow the subsequent negligence of a third party to break the chain of
causation that was traceable to the negligence of the government's employee. Instead, they elected to treat the local government and the third
party as co-tortfeasors who were jointly liable for the damages suffered
by the victim. By contrast, the fourth circuit concluded that the subsequent negligence of one of the drivers involved in a collison "constituted the sole proximate cause of the accident" and thus relieved the
49
city of liability. "
To the extent that article 2317 allows recovery without proof of the
local government's actual or constructive knowledge, it forces courts to
reconsider, under different labels, many of the same issues involved in
negligence cases. When the injured party acts imprudently, courts will
have to decide whether "victim fault" is a species of proximate causation
that relieves the custodian of the thing from liability or a form of
contributory negligence that may now merely reduce liability."10 When
147. La. Civ. Code art. 2323.
148. Pope v. City of Baton Rouge, 449 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Duvernay
v. State, 433 So. 2d 254 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983). In Pope, the first circuit ruled that
the negligence of one of the drivers barred recovery by his insurer. However, the accident
in Pope occured prior to the effective date of Louisiana's comparative negligence statute.
Thus, the bar to recovery was the traditional contributory negligence rule rather than a
ruling that the injured party's action interrupted the chain of causation.
149. Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So. 2d 392, 394 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 So. 2d 150 (La. 1983).
150. See generally Plant, Comparative Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 40 La. L.
Rev. 403 (1980); cf. Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2, 448 So. 2d 162, 165
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1984) (holding that "victim fault" is tantamount to the assumption
of risk defense in traditional negligence actions).
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a third party, rather than the injured person, has acted imprudently,
the same question arises as a question of "third party fault." Should
the third party's negligence be regarded as a contributing cause that
does not affect the local government's liability, or should it be regarded
as a sufficiently independent cause that it relieves the city of legal
responsibility for the accident? During the past year, the courts of appeal
have decided a number of signal and sign cases under article 2317
without confronting the basic choices they are being asked to make.
Although they may be establishing the practical boundaries of liability
for particular situations, the courts have failed to develop the basic
concepts in ways that permit their confident application to new situations
in the future.
The first ambiguity in these decisions concerns the degree of proof
necessary for the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case under article
2317. Decisions applying this article have imposed liability on a custodian
only when the thing causing the injury is "defective" and have also
held that a thing is defective only when it presents "an unreasonable
risk of harm.""'' But the courts have equivocated when explaining how
to determine whether something produces an unreasonable risk of harm.
At one point, the supreme court indicated that article 2317 essentially
created a rule of imputed knowledge that focuses on the impact which
that knowledge would have had on the custodian's conduct. If the
custodian's actual conduct would have been reasonable even in light of
knowledge of the actual risk of injury presented by the thing, the risk
52
of harm is a reasonable one and no basis for 2317 liability exists.1
More recently, however, the court has focused not on the reasonableness
of the defendant's conduct, but on a comparison of "the magnitude of
the risk posed and the gravity of the harm threatened by the thing
causing the injury" with the "risks presented by other things in our
society." 53
The two formulations would apparently produce divergent outcomes
in some, but not all, traffic signal and sign cases. Consider, for example,
the case of a traffic signal blinking red in both directions.1 4 If the
applicable test would hold the signal to be defective when, given knowledge of it, the local government's failure to repair the malfunction would

151. See Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1983); Kent v. Gulf States Utils.,
418 So. 2d 493 (La. 1982); Shipp v. City of Alexandria, 395 So. 2d 727 (La. 1981);
Loescher v. Parr, 324 So. 2d 441 (La. 1975). For recent decisions refusing to impose
liability because the thing did not present an "unreasonable" risk of harm, see Tipton
v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 441 So. 2d 453 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Maltzahn v. City
of New Orleans, 433 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
152. Kent v. Gulf States Utils., 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1983); see also id. at 50102 (Dennis, J., concurring).
153. Entrevia v. Hood,.427 So. 2d 1146 (La. 1984), analyzed in Note, Entrevia v.
Hood: Back to Loescher v. Parr, 44 La. L. Rev. 1485 (1984).

19841

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1983-84

have been unreasonable, then the dual-red signal would probably present
such an unreasonable risk of harm because reasonably prudent local
employees would have repaired the malfunction after learning of its
existence. But if the signal creates an unreasonable risk of harm only
if it presents a substantial danger of serious harm when compared with
the general utility of traffic signals, the dual-red light might not represent
an unreasonable risk. Because the traffic rules of the state require all
motorists to stop for red lights,' the danger of a serious accident would
be relatively small if motorists drive their automobiles in a non-negligent
manner.
Of course, some malfunctioning signals might produce an unreasonable risk of harm under either test. For example, a signal that was
showing green in both directions would surely satisfy the imputed knowledge test because it would present a situation that reasonable local
officials would promptly correct if they knew of its existence. But the
dual-green light might also present an unreasonable risk of harm under
the more generalized balancing test that the supreme court has used in
its most recent opinion. Because the applicable traffic rules allow motorists to proceed through green traffic signals without stopping, 5 6 the
risk of a serious injury would be very high and might even be regarded
as unreasonable when compared with the significant utility of traffic
signals.'
The recent opinions of the courts of appeal have managed to avoid
the potential ambiguity of the supreme court decisions defining unreasonable risks. None of the decisions that actually held a governmental
entity liable under 2317 for a malfunctioning or missing signal or sign
attempted to define when the risk of harm presented by such a signal
or sign was unreasonable. One such case involved a light that showed
green in both directions.' 7 As explained above, that situation could be
construed to create an unreasonable risk of harm under either test, and
the opinion of the second circuit simply asserted that the "malfunction
. . . constitutes an unreasonable risk of harm" without explaining the
particular approach it adopted. In another, the fourth circuit held the
city of New Orleans liable for damages arising from an accident at an
intersection with a missing stop sign without addressing the unreasonableness issue at all. 5 8 Similarly, other decisions indicating that the

154. A missing stop sign would generally present a similar situation. Louisiana law
provides traffic rules for intersections without signs, La. R.S. 32:121 (Supp. 1985), thus
reducing the danger of serious accidents. Nonetheless, reasonably prudent local employees
would probably replace the sign if they knew it was missing.
155. La. R.S. 32:234(A)(1) (1963).
156. La. R.S. 32:232(l)(a) (Supp. 1985).
157. Jones v. Winston, 437 So. 2d 889, 893 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983).
158. Victor v. Saporito, 444 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984). The actual basis
of the Victor decision is extremely difficult to determine. Although the plaintiff claimed
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malfunctioning or missing signals or signs present unreasonable risks of
harm have done so with no detailed analysis of the applicable test and,
in any event, their discussions of the issue can generally be dismissed
as dicta.5 9
The cases dealing with victim fault and third party fault have likewise
failed to establish clear criteria for deciding when the actions of the
injured person or a third party will interrupt the chain of causation
that would otherwise be traced to the thing under the local government's
control. The courts have generally, but not always, exonerated the
governmental custodian when the driver of one of the cars involved in
the accident has been negligent- 6 or when a third party's misconduct
caused the traffic signal to malfunction.' 6' They have, however, generally
contented themselves with concluding without further analysis that the
negligent driver "proximately caused the accident.' ' 62 Perhaps the most
confused of the decisions is Victor v. Saporito. 63 The fourth circuit's
opinion discusses the injured person's lack of fault, presumably as a
basis for rejecting a defense of victim fault, but completely ignores the
possibility of negligence of the other driver as the basis for a finding
of third party fault that would also eliminate the local g'overnment's
liability.
The conceptual confusion of the traffic signal and sign opinions
provides a specific confirmation of the general point Professor Wex
Malone made a couple of years ago: use of a strict liability standard
under 2317 does little to advance, and much to obfuscate, the analysis

that the city was liable on the basis of article 2315 and article 2317, the court initially
declared that it was basing its opinion on 2317: "Because we find that the City was
strictly liable for the injuries suffered by the plaintiff, there is no need to determine
whether it was simply negligent." Id. at 673. But later in the opinion, the court gave
the following explanation for the city's liability: "[Plaintiff was traveling on a superior
road and would have had the right of way had not the City been negligent." Id. at 674
(emphasis added).
159. See, e.g., Pope v. City of Baton Rouge, 449 So. 2d 1070, 1073 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1984); Wilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 So. 2d 786, 788 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984)
(holding that an obstructed stop sign does not "constitute a trap to motorists approaching
the intersection on the unfavored street"); cf. Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So.
2d 392, 394 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983) (declaring that the subsequent negligence of driver
"exonerates" city from strict liability imposed by 2317).
160. Wilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 446 So. 2d 786 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1984); Norris v.
City of New Orleans, 433 So. 2d 392 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); cf. Pope v. City of
Baton Rouge, 449 So. 2d 1070, 1074 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (holding that the victim's
negligence bars recovery under article 2317).
161. Duvernay v. State, 433 So. 2d 254, 259 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1983).
162. Norris v. City of New Orleans, 433 So. 2d 392, 394 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
163. 444 So. 2d 672 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); cf. Pope v. City of Baton Rouge, 449
So. 2d 1070, 1079 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984) (A driver's negligence bars his own recovery
under 2317 but does not constitute third party fault that relieves the city from liability
to others injured in the accident.).
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suggested by more traditional negligence principles.' 64 The supreme court
should, therefore, reverse itself and return to the more hospitable parameters of article 2315.
Until the state's highest court choses to abandon strict liability under
article 2317, both it and the courts of appeal should confine the 2317
doctrine within the narrowest possible boundaries. 65 Two techniques are
available to accomplish such a narrowing. First, the courts should combine the two tests used to determine whether a thing presents an "unreasonable risk of harm." They should require both that the plaintiff
show that the actions of the defendant would have been unreasonable
if the defendant had had perfect knowledge and that the danger of
harm presented by the thing be so great as to outweigh the thing's
general utility. Second, the courts should apply the victim fault and
third party fault. concepts as kinds of proximate causation. That is,
when the subsequent negligence of the injured party or a third person
bears a causal relationship to the accident, the courts should treat the
negligence of that person as sufficient to relieve the custodian of the
thing from legal responsibility for the accident. For the signal and sign
cases, these two steps would seem adequate to allow general negligence
principles to govern the great majority of cases. Perhaps they would
achieve similar results in other situations where the imposition of liability
for the acts of things has engendered similar confusion.
Identification of an Official's Employer
In recent years, Louisiana's courts have struggled with various other
issues arising from the state's abolition' 66 of governmental immunity
from tort liability. One problem that has regularly resurfaced over the
last eight years has been that of identifying the "employer" of various
public officials who serve within the boundaries of specific local governments. 67 Although these officials and their assistants serve within
local geographic areas, imposing liability on local governments seemed
68
unfair because no local governing authority has control over them.
164. See Malone, Ruminations on Liability for the Acts of Things, 42 La. L. Rev.
979 (1982).
165. Cf. Pope v. City of Baton Rouge, 449 So. 2d 1070, 1074 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1984): "Semantic refinement of conceptual theories only confuses further an already
perplexing jurisprudence. Stability in our law, with its many advantages, validates the use
of traditional defenses in tort actions. Weaving an intricate path among defenses perceived
to emanate from La. Civ. Code arts. 2315, et seq., is unnecessary."
166. La. Const. art. XII, § 10; see generally Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Local Government Law, 38 La. L. Rev. 462,
474 n.73 (1978).

167. See cases cited infra at notes 170-74.
168. See, e.g., La. Const. art. VI, § 5(G): "No home rule charter or plan of government
shall contain any provision affecting . . . the offices of district attorney, sheriff, assessor,
clerk of a district court, or coroner, which is inconsistent with this constitution or law."
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Moreover, Louisiana law traditionally refused to classify the offices
themselves as governmental entities,1 69 thus precluding a suit against the
"office." Faced with this anomalous situation, the Louisiana Supreme
Court-primarily in a series of cases dealing with liability for the actions
of deputy sheriffs-initially held that the state'70 rather than the parish' 7'
was vicariously liable as the deputy's employer. The legislature then
enacted a statute purporting to relieve the state from liability for the
72
torts of state officers who serve local areas and their subordinates.'
After the passage of the statute, the court ruled-in Jenkins v. Jefferson
Parish Sheriff's Office'7 3-that one of its effects was to make the sheriff
liable "in his official capacity" for torts committed by his deputies.
The decisions of the past year indicate that Louisiana law relating
to vicarious liability for torts committed by local officials and their
assistants remains in a state of disequilibrium. Although the courts of
appeal have experienced relatively little difficulty in applying the "official
capacity" rule established in Jenkins, two problems remain. First, a
decision of the supreme court holds that, notwithstanding the statute
immunizing the state from tort liability, those who work for officials
are still employees of the state for some purposes. Second, the courts
of appeal and the supreme court have continued to skirt the question
of whether the special statutory rules governing those employees are
unconstitutional attempts to reestablish a limited form of governmental
immunity "from liability for . . . injury to person" in violation of
Article XII, section 10 of the Louisiana Constitution.
The bulk of the recent decisions of the courts of appeal continue
to involve the liability of sheriffs. For the most part, their application
of the current rules of liability is unexceptional. That is, they have
reflected a willingness to follow Jenkins and hold the sheriff liable in
his official capacity, 74 but they have emphasized the need for negligence

169. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Grant Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 350 So. 2d 236, 239
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1977). The Louisiana rule follows the general view of American
jurisdictions. See Murchison, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 19771978 Term-Local Government Law, 39 La. L. Rev. 843, 871 n.132 (1979).
170. Foster v. Hampton, 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980), analyzed in Murchison, 19791980 Developments, supra note 107, at 518-19. Accord, Hryhorchuk v. Smith, 390 So.
2d 497 (La. 1980) (constable); Mullins v. State, 387 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980) (coroner).
171. Foster v. Hampton, 352 So. 2d 197 (La. 1977), rev'd. 381 So. 2d 789 (La. 1980),
analyzed in Murchison, supra note 168, at 871-77. Accord, Cosenza v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
341 So. 2d 1304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977) (clerk of city court).
172. 1978 La. Acts, No. 318 (amending La. R.S. 33:1433 and adding La. R.S. 42:1441),
analyzed in Murchison, supra note 168, at 877-79.
173. 402 So. 2d 669 (La. 1981), analyzed in Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments,
supra note 142, at 479-83.
174. E.g., Sciortino v. Alfano, 435 So. 2d 1010 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied,
437 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1983); Duvernay v. State, 433 So. 2d 254, 259 (La. App. 1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 150 (La. 1983).
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on the part of the sheriff or his deputy as a prerequisite to liability.175
Nonetheless, some of the sheriff cases are troublesome because of the
courts' willingness to read Jenkins as a general rule that public officials
and their assistants are never employees of the state 7 6 and the courts'
failure to recognize that legislatively imposed limits to liability may be
unconstitutional in light of the constitution's abolition of governmental

tort immunity. 177
The broad reading of Jenkins characteristic of some of the appellate
decisions seems clearly inconsistent with the Louisiana Supreme Court's
recent opinions. For example, in Diaz v. Allstate Insurance Co.,' 7 s the
supreme court held that an employee of a district attorney's office was
covered by a statute providing for indemnity of state employees who
are held liable for damages "arising out of any claim, demand, suit or
judgment in any court by reason of alleged negligence or other act by
the . . .employee.' ' 79 Relying on pre-Jenkins decisions defining district
175. Moore v. Foti, 440 So. 2d 530 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 So.
2d 1224 (La. 1984); Wright v. Louisiana Power & Light, 433 So. 2d 796 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 214 (La. 1983).
176. See Sciortino v. Alfano, 435 So. 2d 1010, 1013-14 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 437 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1983); cf. Duvernay v. State, 433 So. 2d 254 (La. App.
1st Cir.), cert. denied, 440 So. 2d 150 (La. 1983) (relieving state of liability without
discussing possible liability as employer of deputy sheriff); but see Wright v. Louisiana
Power & Light, 433 So. 2d 796, 802 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 So. 2d 214
(La. 1983) (reserving question of state's liability as employer of deputy sheriff).
177. See Sciortino v. Alfano, 435 So. 2d 1010, 1013 (La. App. 5th Cir.), cert. denied,
437 So. 2d 1149 (La. 1983) (applying pre-1978 limitation on sheriff's liability); cf. Kahl
v. Baudoin, 449 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1984) (construing worker's compensation statute to
allow recovery by a deputy sheriff killed in an accident occurring before passage of statute
excluding deputies from statute's coverage).
178. 433 So. 2d 699 (La. 1983). The authority of Diaz is weakened by the fact that
two of the four members of the majority concurred without indicating the extent to which
they accepted the rationale of the majority opinion. Id. at 702.
Justices Calogero, Marcus, and Blanche dissented. Justice Calogero argued that the
indemnity statute did not apply in Diaz for two reasons: (1) it only applies after entry
of a judgment or approved settlement against the employee; and (2) it only applies to
suits filed in federal court. Id. at 702-03. Justice Marcus premised his dissent on his
rejection of the majority's premise "that an employee of a district attorney is an employee
of the state." Id. at 703. Justice Blanche dissented without opinion.
179. La. R.S. 13:5108.2 (1982). Following the supreme court's decision in Diaz, the
legislature amended La. R.S. 13:5108.2 in the 1984 session to exclude from its coverage
employees of political subdivisions and "the parish officials set forth and named in Article
VI, Sections 5(G) and 7(B) of the constitution [and] . . . the employees thereof." 1984
La. Acts, No. 923.
As Justice Calogero points out in his dissent in Diaz, 433 So. 2d at 703, some portions
of the indemnity statute indicate that its purpose was to permit indemnity for employees
held liable in suits filed in federal court, e.g., La. R.S. 13:5801.2(G). But other portions
indicate that a more general relief was intended, e.g. La. R.S. 13:5108.2(E) ("in any
court"), and the reason for a special federal court provision is difficult to discover in
light of the existence of La. R.S. 13:5108.1, which authorizes indemnity for federal actions
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1983).
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attorneys and other constitutional officers as state rather than local
officials,8 0 the court held that a district attorney's employee was a state
employee for the purpose of the indemnity statute. Recognizing that the
state had enacted legislation that attempted to foreclose the state's direct
liability to the injured party, the court treated the liability statute as
"irrelevant" to the separate question of the employee's right to indemnity.'' Similarly, Kahl v. Baudoin8 2 held that the statutory elimination of the state's liability for the torts of deputy sheriffs did not
alter the deputy's status as a state employee under the worker's compensation statute.
By construing the indemnity statute as independent of the direct
liability provision and interpreting the 1981 amendment to the worker's
compensation statute" 3 as a substantive change that had only prospective
effect, the court managed to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of
both attempts to limit the liability of governmental entities and public
officials. Jenkins had previously termed the constitutional status of the
tort liability statute "questionable,"' '8 4 but the court has still managed
to avoid an explicit decision on the constitutionality of either statute.
The resulting uncertainty regarding these statutes serves no public interest, and the court should take the first available opportunity to
eliminate the doubt surrounding them. Previous symposia 8 ' have outlined
the approach the court should take: it should recognize the legislature's
power to replace one responsible governmental entity with another, but
it should invalidate attempts to deny injured parties a governmental
defendant in situations where some governmental entity would have been
responsible if the government had been a private party. Applying these
standards to the issues that have surfaced during the past year in the
court of appeals, the court should accept Jenkins' description of con-

180. 433 So. 2d at 701.
181. Id.
182. 449 So. 2d 1334 (La. 1984). Justice Lemmon concurred in part and dissented in
part. He agreed with the holding that the deputy was the sheriff's employee but disagreed
that he was a state employee as well. Although he acknowledged that treating the deputy
as a state employee did justice under the particular facts of Kahl, he argued that it did
"a disservice to the developing jurisprudence in this area." Id. at 1338. Justice Marcus
dissented on the ground that a deputy sheriff "was not an employee of the state." Id.
at 1337. Justice Blanche dissented on the ground that the statute excluded deputy sheriffs
from the protection of the worker's compensation statute. Id.
183. 449 So. 2d at 1336. La. R.S. 23:1034 excludes public officials from the coverage
of the worker's compensation statute, and a 1981 amendment to that section expressly
defined deputy sheriffs as public officials for purposes of the exclusion. See 1981 La.
Acts, No. 25. For a brief description of the "public official" exclusion and the potential
constitutional challenge to it, see Murchison, supra note 3, at 408.
184. 402 So. 2d at 670.
185. See Murchison, supra note 13, at 409-10; Murchison, 1981-1982 Developments,
supra note 142, at 482-83; Murchison, supra note 169, at 877-79.
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stitutional officers as "governmental entities"''8 6 and sustain the legislature's attempt to limit state liability for the torts of constitutional
officers and their assistants. At the same time, the court should hold
unconstitutional the legislature's attempt to exclude public officials from
the protections of the worker's compensation statute.
In the final analysis, this small area of governmental tort liability
remains ambiguous because the legislature has failed to do what it should
have done at the time of the first case involving liability for torts
committed by deputy sheriffs. What it should have done then is what
it should do now-draft a general statute that affirmatively prescribes
which governmental entities are responsible for personal injuries arising
out of the employment relationships of constitutional officers and those
who work for them.8 7 The decisions of the last eight years amply
demonstrate the unnecessary doubt and confusion that will continue
without such a general statutory solution.

186. 402 So. 2d at 671.
187. For an attempt to outline one possible statutory approach, see Murchison, supra
note 169, at 878-79.

